Using a newly created microeconomic archive of U.S. imports at the tariff-line level for 1930-33, we construct industry-level tariff wedges incorporating the input-output structure of U.S. economy and the heterogenous role of imports across sectors of the economy. We use these wedges to show that the average tariff rate of 46% in 1933 substantially understated the true impact of the Smoot-Hawley (SH) tariff structure, which we estimate to be equivalent to a uniform tariff rate of 70%. We use these wedges to calculate the impact of the Smoot Hawley tariffs on total factor productivity and welfare. In our benchmark parameterization, we find that tariff protection reduced TFP by 1.2% relative to free trade prior to the Smoot Hawley legislation. TFP fell by an additional 0.5% between 1930 and 1933 due to Smoot Hawley. We also conduct counterfactual policy exercises and examine the sensitivity of our results to changes in the elasticity of substitution and the import share. A doubling of the substitution elasticities yields a TFP decline of almost 5% relative to free trade, with an additional reduction due to SH of 0.4%.
Despite the theatre surrounding the Smoot-Hawley tari¤, the scope of the legislation and its economic impact remain poorly understood. Much of what is known about the economic e¤ects of SH and the foreign retaliation that took place comes from macroeconomic models that focus on the impact of the average tari¤ on imports. The emerging consensus from this literature is that the tari¤ war alone could have at most precipitated a moderate recession with a larger impact on international trade, but the quantitative e¤ects would be trivial in comparison to the depth and duration of the Great Depression. Far less is know about the impact of the SH tari¤s across U.S. industries, and the resulting potential for sectoral misallocation. Our goal in this paper is to assess the extent of sectoral misallocation, and to develop a measure of their aggregate impact. 1 The most obvious reason for the lack of study on the e¤ect of sectoral misallocations resulting from the SH tari¤s is the complexity of the tari¤ schedules themselves. The tari¤ and trade data compiled for the quantitative analysis of this paper is the complete line item data from the Foreign Trade and Navigation of the United States (FTNUS) at three di¤erent points in time. The number of individual import line items (tari¤ lines) typically exceeds 4,000 with ad-valorem-equivalent duties ranging from a few percentage points to almost 300. Even more challenging is the fact that the duties themselves took one of three forms: i) pure ad-valorem, assessed as a percentage of the foreign value imported, ii) speci…c duties, assessed in nominal U.S. currency units per physical quantity imported or iii) a combination of the two. 2 The practical implication of this is a high degree of dispersion of e¤ective ad valorem tari¤ rates across sectors, and signi…cant movements in both the mean and variance of those rates over time due to a combination of legislative changes and price-induced changes in the ad valorem equivalent of speci…c duties.
The impact of both legislative and price-induced variation is evident even at the level of the commonly used aggregate tari¤ index computed as the ratio of customs revenue to total dutiable imports. Figure 1 shows this measure of the aggregate U.S. tari¤ rate annually from 1914 to 1940 and identi…es the dates of three key pieces of tari¤ legislation. The …rst is the Emergency Tari¤ Act of 1921 which was quickly followed by the Fordney-McCumber Tari¤ Act of 1922.
Combined, these two pieces of legislation led to a sharp rise in the tari¤ index from its historical trough in 1920. The third notation in the …gure is the date the SH tari¤ schedules went into e¤ect, June 17, 1930. The increase relative to 1929 is evident, though smaller in percentage terms than the increases of the early 1920s. Note, however, the aggregate tari¤ measure increases from 44:7% in 1930 to 59% in 1932 despite the absence of additional legislative changes. Prior research suggests that much of the variation in this measure during the interwar period re ‡ects the e¤ect of price level changes on the ad valorem equivalent of speci…c duties. In particular, the rapid in ‡ation of World War I reduced tari¤ levels substantially from 1914 to 1920 while de ‡ation of the early 1930s increased tari¤ levels substantially above the rates determined at 1930 prices. In addition, since the tari¤ rates in Figure 1 are value-weighted averages of individual tari¤ lines, they will be downward biased measures of the average tari¤ level in the SH schedule due to import substitution bias while also failing to re ‡ect the distribution of tari¤ levels across items.
These issues turn out to be central to our quantitative analysis because it is well recognized that both the mean and the dispersion of tari¤ rates play signi…cant roles in determining the welfare e¤ects of trade barriers. In particular, a high degree of dispersion in tari¤ rates across sectors can exacerbate the aggregate tari¤ distortion and worsen the allocation of resources across sectors. 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 Notes: The ad-valorem equivalent rate is computed as the ratio of customs revenues to U.S. dutiable imports.
FIGURE 1 -UNITED STATES AD-VALOREM EQUIVALENT TARIFF RATE
Our objective in this paper is to address the role of the dispersion of tari¤ rates under the SH legislation by developing a panel data set that traces the e¤ective ad valorem tari¤ rates at the tari¤ line level over the period from 1930 to 1933. This panel can be used to address the question of how the distribution of e¤ective tari¤ rates changed at the line item level as a result of the SH legislation and subsequent de ‡ation. Combined with our structural model, it is possible to construct tari¤ wedges, which show the variation across sectors in the price of imported intermediates resulting from the changes in the tari¤ schedules. In particular, these wedges identify signi…cant movements in both the mean and variance of tari¤ rates over time due to a combination of legislative changes and price-induced changes in the ad valorem equivalents of speci…c duties. 3 We utilize these tari¤ wedges in a general equilibrium model to calculate the impact of changes in protection on macroeconomic variables, including employment, consumption, and domestic price indices. 4 We derive two aggregate measures of the welfare impact of tari¤s. The …rst is their e¤ect on total factor productivity, which we de…ne to be the number of units of the composite consumption bundle per unit of domestic productive resources. The second is the consumption equivalent, which is the compensation needed in units of aggregate consumption to make the representative agent indi¤erent between allocations under free trade and those under the existing tari¤ structure. In our benchmark parameterization, we …nd that the pre-Smoot
Hawley tari¤ legislation had the e¤ect of reducing total factor productivity relative to the free trade level by 1:2%. The increases in tari¤s associated with the Smoot Hawley and the de ‡ation from 1930-33 had the e¤ect of reducing TFP by an additional 0:5%. We use a counterfactual exercise to show that if SH had not been passed, the e¤ects of de ‡ation would still have reduced TFP by 0:3% due to the widespread use of speci…c tari¤s. The consumption equivalent measure yields e¤ects of a similar magnitude for the benchmark parameterization. We also show the impact of the dispersion in the tari¤ structure across goods in the sense that the uniform tari¤ equivalent of the existing tari¤ schedule is substantially above the average tari¤ during this period.
Our paper contributes to the growing literature on the e¤ect of policy distortions on aggregate outcomes. Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) use a calibration exercise to show that distortions in the allocation of capital and labor between …rms can lead to substantial reductions in aggregate productivity. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) calculate the dispersion of marginal products of capital across …rms in India and China, and argue that reducing the dispersion in these countries to the level observed in the US would have the e¤ect of raising productivity by 40 60% in India and 30 50% in China. Our analysis abstracts from distortions in factor markets, and focuses on the e¤ect of sectoral tari¤ wedges. The reduction in total factor productivity we …nd as a result of sectoral misallocations due to tari¤ protection are of a much smaller magnitude than those 3 The potential importance of using microdata to address the pattern of protection was …rst shown by Crucini (1994) , who constructed annual data from 1903 to 1940 on 32 imported items to examine the variability of e¤ective ad valorem tari¤ rates. His data show that there is substantial variability in the ad valorem rates across sectors over time, resulting from both legislated tari¤ changes and di¤erences in the importance of speci…c tari¤s in the legislation applying to individual items. Our analysis extends Crucini's analysis by signi…cantly expanding the range of products covered and by developing measures to evaluate how the distortions evolved over this period. 4 Irwin (1998b) analyzes the e¤ect of the Smoot Hawley tari¤s using aggregate data and a CGE model to estimate sectoral e¤ects, but does not utilize the degree of sectoral decomposition that we do. associated with factor market distortions, presumably due to the fact that trade accounted for a relatively small fraction of U.S. consumption and intermediate inputs during this period of history. We provide counterfactual exercises to illustrate the sensitivity of our results to changes in the import share of consumption goods and material inputs, as well as to the assumed elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic goods. These exercises provide some perspective on the potential for misallocation e¤ects arising from commercial policy for other time periods and other nations.
We proceed in the following manner. Section 2 presents the multisector general equilibrium model and uses it to construct measures of the e¤ects of tari¤ rates on aggregate variables. Sections 3 describes the construction of the panel data series on tari¤ rates, compares the sector level panel data to the line item data and presents estimates of sector level tari¤ wedges. Section 4 reports the results for the aggregate e¤ects of tari¤ policy, and section 5 concludes.
The Model
Our goal in this section is to develop a tractable model that can be used in conjunction with our tari¤ line panel to obtain a measure of the impact of sectoral misallocation on aggregate variables. Our modeling choices are driven by two features of the data from this period. First, 75% of imports are intermediate goods according to the input-output tables for 1929 (Leontief (1941) ). Therefore, we want a model that captures the substitution between imported materials and domestically produced materials in the production process. Second, there is substantial variation across tari¤ lines in the extent to which protection was increased during this period, as well as substantial di¤erences across sectors in the degree to which imported inputs are used in the production process. For example, imports accounted for 75% of intermediate inputs in the sugar, glucose and starch industry, but less than 1% of intermediate inputs into the agricultural industry. This heterogeneity combined with the fact that sugar duties were much higher and varied more over time than most other agricultural duties indicates the di¤erent industry-level distortions of these respective duties. This motivates the use of a multisector model that allows for di¤erential e¤ects of tari¤ protection across the various production sectors.
The Multisector Production Model
We consider a GE production model with N F sectors producing non-traded …nal consumption goods and one sector representing exportable goods (sector 0). The N F …nal goods sectors correspond to the sectors in the Leontief input-output tables. This model allows us to capture substitution by …rms between domestic and imported material inputs, as well substitution by consumers between domestic and imported …nal consumption goods. Our model also has a block recursive structure that provides simple measures of the e¤ects of the tari¤ structure on aggregate variables.
Each of the N F + 1 production sectors produce …nal output using inputs of domestic value added and material inputs. We assume that domestic capital and labor are used in the same proportions in all sectors, so that value added can be treated as a composite input whose price, p V , is the same for all sectors. The technology for sector j is given by the unit cost function
Here P jM is the price of material inputs in sector j, and F is the elasticity of substitution between value added and materials in the production of …nal goods. The material inputs for sector j consist of domestic and imported materials. Assuming that the domestic material input is produced using value added alone and that the production of materials is perfectly competitive, the price paid for material inputs in sector j will equal the unit cost of the composite material input,
where p jm is the cost of a composite of line item imported inputs used in production in sector j and M is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported materials.
The sector-speci…c input prices are constructed from our tari¤ line panel using the inputoutput structure of the U.S. economy (Leontief (1941) ) and the existing microeconomic tari¤ structure. Letting i be one plus the ad valorem tari¤ rate on good i and q i the world price of that good, the import price index for materials used by sector j will be
where N m is the number of tari¤ lines, m is the elasticity of substitution between tari¤ lines, and the b ji , are parameters that re ‡ect the intensity with which good i is used as an input into the production of sector j. 5 With perfect competition in the production of materials and …nal goods, the price of a …nal good will equal its unit cost,
We assume that the exportable good is sold on world markets at an exogenously given world price, q 0F 1. The zero pro…t condition for the exportable sector can be inverted to solve for the return to domestic value added as a function of the price of imported goods used in the exportable sector, p V (p 0m ). This solution can then be inserted into the remaining zero pro…t conditions to solve for the prices of the N F non-traded consumption goods. We thus have solutions for prices of domestic non-traded goods and factor inputs as a function of the vector of tari¤s, , and world prices of the home country importables, q, that determine the p jm from (1). 6 In the case of a small open economy, q is exogenously given and there will be complete pass through of tari¤s to prices paid by the domestic purchasers of imports. We will treat the US as a small open economy in our analysis below, which merits some discussion. Our assumption ensures that all of the distorting e¤ects of the tari¤ are borne by the US, and thus can be thought of as representing an upper bound on the aggregate productivity e¤ects of trade barriers. 7 In contrast, if US tari¤ increases have the e¤ect of reducing world prices, this will represent a terms of trade improvement for the US that will be an o¤set against the productivity losses that we calculate. This could be captured in our analysis by allowing for incomplete passthrough of tari¤s to domestic prices. However, there is little evidence of negative e¤ects of tari¤ rate changes on world prices in our tari¤ line data. 8 The absence of a signi…cant correlation seems consistent with the fact that US imports were only $4:4 billion in 1929, which represented approximately 12% of world trade. Also, tari¤ retaliation by foreign countries would have the e¤ect of mitigating the terms of trade improvements that the US experienced on account of its own tari¤ rate increases.
We conclude our discussion of the production side of the model with the production function for domestic value added,
where K is the input of capital, L is the input of labor, and A is the productivity level. We will undertake a short run analysis in which the capital stock is assumed to be …xed. The market wage will be determined by the marginal productivity condition,
For a given K=L, protection will lower the wage rate because it lowers p V = p V (p 0m ): The level of labor input will be determined as part of the household decision problem, to which we now turn.
Household Decisions and Market Equilibrium
The preferences of households are assumed to take the following form:
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption is given by 1 s , and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply by 1 1 : The consumption levels C j are demands for the …nal goods from the production sectors j = 1; ::; N F , C m is the consumption of imports, and C is the elasticity of substitution between all consumption goods, domestic and imported.
The household budget constraint is
where T is the amount of tari¤ revenue transferred to households. The prices p cm and p jF are the indices for imported consumption goods and each non-traded …nal good j, constructed as in equations (1) and (2), respectively. The household consumption allocation between domestic and imported goods can be solved using two stage budgeting. The necessary conditions for choice of C and L yield
where
P C is the price index for consumption, which can be used to derive the shares of expenditure on domestic and imported goods in aggregate consumption,
Letting Y jF denote the output of the …nal good of sector j, the market clearing conditions for domestic consumption goods are
The market clearing condition for domestic value added requires that the sum of demands for value added across sectors equal the supply,
is the share of value added (both direct and as a share of materials) in sector j. This market clearing expression can be used to solve for the level of exports as a function of aggregate value added and the output of non-traded goods,
In order to determine the level of tari¤ revenue, we need to derive demands for the imported products at the tari¤ line level. The share of imports of tari¤ line i in the expenditure of activity j on imported inputs is given by
. Using (7), the value of imports in tari¤ line i will be the sum of the value of imports for …nal consumption, ci m P C C, and the value of imports for intermediate use from the various production activities, P N F j=0 ji jm p jF Y jF , where jm = 1 jV is the share of imported materials in the cost of production of good j. Using (8) and (9), we obtain an expression for tari¤ revenue as a function of value added and aggregate consumption:
The terms V and C capture the e¤ect of an increase in value added and consumption on tari¤ revenue. These factors play a key role in measuring the distortions from the tari¤ structure, because they represent the …scal e¤ects of household decisions regarding labor supply and consumption.
To interpret the coe¢ cient V , note that an increase in value added will result in an increase in production of exportable goods from (9) . This increase in exports requires an increase in the import of intermediate inputs for the exportable sector, which raises tari¤ revenue and has a positive spillover to household income. The interpretation of C is more complicated, because it involves a reallocation of resources between the traded and non-traded goods sectors. An increase in aggregate consumption will raise imports of …nal consumption goods and imports of materials to produce the non-traded domestic consumption goods. However, it will also result in a reduction in production of exportables, and thus a reduction in imported material inputs to the exportable sector. This leads to an ambiguous e¤ect of an increase in aggregate consumption on tari¤ revenue, since tari¤ revenue could actually fall if exports are intensive in the use of intermediate inputs relative to other production and consumption activities.
9 Substituting (10) into the budget constraint yields
The right hand side of (11) expresses the amount of the composite consumption good that can be generated per unit of the composite factor input as a function of the tari¤ structure and the terms of trade. This index can be interpreted as a measure of total factor productivity for the open economy. The numerator is the social return to value added, which is the market return plus the additional tari¤ revenue generated from an additional unit of value added. The denominator of this expression is the social cost of consumption, which is the market cost less the tari¤ revenue generated by additional imports (which could be negative). The introduction of tari¤s will reduce the real return to value added, p V P C , relative to the free trade level because protection reduces the return to value added in the exportable sector and raises the relative cost of imported intermediates and …nal goods used in the consumption bundle. The adjustment for tari¤ revenue, (1+ V ) (1 C ) , will be equal to unity at free trade and at autarky from (10) . It can be shown that this measure of total factor productivity is maximized at free trade in the small country case, since tari¤s result in deadweight losses by causing ine¢ cient substitution of domestic goods for imports.
In addition to its impact on the e¢ ciency of resource use, protection will also distort labor supply and consumption decisions. Substituting (6) into (11) and using the fact that wL = p V V , we obtain a solution for the equilibrium level of employment
where (s 1) + > 0 for all s 0 since 1. The existence of tari¤ protection will reduce both p V P C and T F P relative to the free trade level. The former e¤ect will tend to reduce the level of employment relative to free trade, whereas the latter e¤ect will tend to increase it. Thus, tari¤ protection will have an ambiguous e¤ect on employment relative to the free trade level.
The equilibrium level of consumption is obtained by substituting from (12) and (4) into (6), which yields
Consumption will be increasing in p V P C and T F P , so tari¤ protection will unambiguously reduce consumption relative to the free trade level.
The solutions to (13) and (12) can be substituted into (5) to construct the indirect utility function
(14) will be maximized at free trade in the small country case. To calculate the e¤ect of a given tari¤ structure, 0 , on welfare we can calculate the level of consumption that would lead to the same welfare as at free trade, given the distorted labor supply. This consumption equivalent value, which we denote C E , is the solution to
The expressions (11) and (15) can be used to measure the aggregate e¤ects of tari¤ protection on resource allocation and welfare. If the tari¤ structure does not a¤ect aggregate employment, then aggregate value added will be constant and the loss in consumption due to tari¤ protection will coincide with the reduction in TFP. When tari¤ protection reduces (raises) employment, the loss in consumption will be smaller (larger) than the reduction in TFP.
A second question of interest is the e¤ect of the variance in the tari¤ structure on welfare.
This question can be addressed by solving for the uniform tari¤ that yields the same welfare level as the existing tari¤ structure. Letting 0 be an initial tari¤ vector and q 0 the vector of world prices of importable goods, the uniform tari¤ vector U that yields the same domestic welfare will be the solution to
This measure corresponds to the trade restrictiveness index (TRI) constructed by Anderson and Neary (2005). level trough. This is important for our study of the relationship between imports and tari¤s because many customs duties were speci…c. Thus, the price level trough also coincides with the peak ad-valorem-equivalent rates of duty for many imported goods. As far as we know, this is the only archive of U.S. imports and duties in existence at the line item level for the 1930s. 
The Tari¤ Line Data and Sectoral Price Indices

Construction of Panel Data
Conducting research in an environment with enormous heterogeneity in the products and the tari¤ levels across them poses some unique challenges. To measure the change in the quantity imported in response to a good-speci…c tari¤ change requires careful control of the quality of the matches of goods across time. Attention must also be paid to the fact that tari¤ lines are sometimes split or combined. This makes some rudimentary aggregation necessary to avoid excluding a signi…cant number of entry-level items.
To match goods across time, we employed a text-matching algorithm to tari¤ lines in 1930A
with those in the 1930B and 1933 cross sections. Since there was both splitting and aggregation of tari¤ lines during the period, the text matching algorithm did not provide one to one matches in many cases. In these cases, we constructed an aggregated line item series by taking a weighted average of the individual line items using the 1930A import values as weights. This procedure resulted in a balanced panel of 495 line items, accounting for 18% of trade in 1930A and 25%
of trade in 1933. The reduction in the number of tari¤ lines occurs for two reasons. First, aggregation naturally reduces the number of individual tari¤ lines and due to a large degree of re-organization between 1930A and 1930B/1933; it is common for two or more line items to be matched to the same line item in a later cross-section. Second, aggregation exacerbates missing data issues. Any set of line items which is matched to any individual observation with missing data have to be discarded since the aggregation cannot be performed. 9 Let~ it denote one plus the legislated ad valorem tari¤ for tari¤ line i and let w it denote the legislated speci…c tari¤ in the tari¤ schedule implemented at time s. The e¤ective ad valorem tari¤ rate at time t is thus de…ned as
where q it is the world price of good cross sections. The variation in e¤ective tari¤ rates between t = 1 and t = 2 will thus include only the price level induced changes resulting from changes in import prices. 10 . We will also use (16) to construct the tari¤ vector 0 (q t ) for t = 1; 2 which represents the counterfactual e¤ective Table A1 of the appendix reports additional comparisons of the full cross-section and panel. 9 A detailed discussion of the quality of the matches from the text matching algorithm, as well as further discussion of the aggregation procedure, is provided in Appendix A.
1 0 The signi…cant role played by price level changes in the e¤ective tari¤ rate has been emphasized by Crucini (1994) and Irwin (1998) . The e¤ective tari¤ rate in (16) can be decomposed into a policy component, which evaluates the change due to legislated changes in~ and w at given world prices, and a price level e¤ect. The correlation between the policy e¤ects and price e¤ects is -.049. A second concern about the reliability of our panel data is the extent to which we have successfully matched industries over time. An important issue in our analysis is the extent to which tari¤s vary over time, whether due to changes in trade policy or due to changes in import prices that alter the protective e¤ect of ad valorem tari¤s. If we are not matching industries correctly over time, this will introduce a measurement error into our comparisons of tari¤ rates over time. 
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Construction of Sectoral Price Indices
The import price indices de…ned in (1) represent ideal price indices for the cost of imports to the N F + 1 production sectors and …nal consumption. Our tari¤ line panel provides the values of jt and q jt required for construction of these indices, but we also need to obtain values for the taste parameters, b ji , and the elasticities of substitution, m .
The expression for the share of imports from tari¤ line i by activity j, ji ( q i i p jm ) = b ji
can be used to express the b ij in terms of observables at time t and the elasticity of substitution,
(17)
Note that since the ijt are homogeneous of degree 0 in the vector of coe¢ cients b i , the system of equations (17) determines the b ij vector only up to a multiplicative constant. We can determine unique values for a given value of m by choosing a normalization of base period price such as
The tari¤ line data provide the total value of imports in the tari¤ line i, v it , but not the allocation of these imports across the …nal goods sectors as required for the jit . However, we are able to construct a proxy for the budget shares in the base year, ij0 , using the Leontief tables and the tari¤ line data by making two assumptions. The …rst assumption is that …nal good industry i's share of consumption of imports from tari¤ lines associated with …nal goods sector k is equal to its share of consumption of domestically produced intermediates from …nal goods sector k. Letting v ij0 denote imports by industry i in tari¤ line j in the base year, J k denote the index set of tari¤ lines associated with industry k, and ki the share of industry k's output that is sold as intermediate goods to sector i, this assumption implies that P
The second assumption is that the imports of …nal goods sector i from …nal goods sector j are allocated across tari¤ lines in proportion to their share in total imports from industry k, which
Together these assumptions imply that v ij = ki v j for all j 2 J k , so that the base year budget shares can be expressed as
ki v j0 i = 1; ::; N C ; j = 1; ::; N m .
(18)
The base year budget shares are calculated using Leontief's 1929 input-output tables for the ki and the 1930 (pre HS) tari¤ line data for the v j0 .
To complete the construction of the import price indices, we calibrate the values of m and C to match the change in imports between 1930A and 1930B in response to the changes in tari¤s and world prices. Using (1) and (8) we can express the demand for imports as materials by sector j from tari¤ line i as m ji = ji ( q i i p jm ) jm (p V ; p jm ) j ( p jF P C )P C C. Totally di¤erentiating this expression and de…ningx = dx x , we havê
where the coe¢ cients s k ji are functions of the elasticities of substitution, ( C ; F ; M ; m ), and the cost shares. A similar expression can be derived form ci , and the model's prediction of the change in imports from tari¤ line i,m i , will be an import share weighted sum of them ji .
Assuming that F = 1; m = M , and thatp V =p jF =p C =ŵ are given by the rate of change in the GDP de ‡ator, we obtain an expression for the change in imports in tari¤ line i as a function of C and m . We choose the values C and m to match price and quantity movements in the data between the 1930A and 1930B cross sections. We then compare the change in imports between the 1930A and 1933 cross sections with the predictions based on our calibrated parameters as an out-of-sample check on our parameter choices. The results for the 1930B and 1933 cross-sections are displayed in the two panels of Figure 3 . Figure 3 displays the model predicted data (blue dots), the actual data (green crosses) and a quadratic regression of actual import prices changes on import quantity changes. We observe that the relationship between import price and quantity changes in 1933 is nearly linear. Further, setting m = 3:5 and C = 2:5, we …nd that the model matches the data very closely. In 1930 we observe a less linear relationship between prices and quantities. In particular, there are a number of goods for which we observe large declines in import quantities in response to moderate import price increases. This is arguably reasonable if the legislated tari¤ increases were foreseen by importers, who were in turn able to increase imports in the …rst half of 1930 before the tari¤ changes took e¤ect. Nonetheless, overall the model matches the data relatively well. 11 1 1 These parameter values yield a price elasticity of import demand elasticity that averages 3.1 Our estimates of the elasticity parameters are relatively low compared to those presented elsewhere in the trade literature. For instance, Eaton and Kortum suggest an elasticity of substitution across imports near 8, while Simonovka and Waugh (2011) suggest that an improved estimate would be closer to 4. We note that increasing m from our benchmark estimate results in higher tari¤ wedges a larger role for tari¤ policy in determining trade ‡ows. In light of our relatively conservative elasticity estimate ,we also consider a counterfactual exercise with larger elasticities. Given our benchmark parameterization, we can use our constructed import price indices to measure the impact of the SH policy on the cost of imported goods across industries and over time. Speci…cally, we calculate the tari¤ wedges for each industry in year t to be Figure 4 where we have sorted the tari¤ wedges from lowest to highest based the 1930A, pre-SH tari¤ wedge. C a n n in g a n d p re se rv in g S u g a r, g lu co se , st a rc h 1930A 1930B 1933 Figure 4 demonstrates a striking degree of heterogeneity in the tari¤ wedge across industries in all three cross-sections. Even before the SH policy was implemented (the blue line) we observe that tari¤ wedge ranges from a low of 1.01 (leather shoes) to a high of 1.91 (sugar, glucose, and starch). Over time we observe that the heterogeneity increases with the onset of the SH tari¤ policy and the propagation of the Great Depression. The green line in Figure 4 represents the tari¤ wedges in 1930 after the SH-policy has been passed. As expected, trade barriers rose for most industries, with many of the largest increases occurring in industries that already had large tari¤ wedges before the change in policy. By 1933 the wedges range from a low of 1.11 (leather shoes) to a high of 2.73 (sugar, glucose and starch). These are enormous increases in trade barriers. At the low end, the leather shoe industry experiences a 10 percent increase from the pre-SH period, which is not small by historical standards). However, it seems minute relative to the 82 percent increase the sugar, glucose and starch industry over the same time. Table 2 shows that the mean tari¤ wedge prior to SH was equivalent to a 32% tari¤ on imported inputs. The SH legislative increase combined with de ‡ation during 1930 increased the size of the mean tari¤ wedge to 46%, and the subsequent de ‡ation further increased it to 59% at the trough of imported prices in 1933. In addition to increasing the mean of the tari¤ wedges, the SH legislation also raised the cross-sectional variance of tari¤ rates substantially from 5%
prior to SH to 12% in 1933.
Aggregate E¤ects of the Tari¤ Structure
The analysis of the previous section documented the wide range of sectoral distortions resulting from the SH tari¤ legislation and subsequent de ‡ation. In this section we examine the impact of these distortions on aggregate consumption, employment, and welfare using the measures derived in Section 2.
The …rst exercise we conduct is to calculate the aggregate impact of protection using the tari¤ rate t t (q t ) in time period t, which is calculated from (16) using the tari¤ schedule from period t and evaluating the ad valorem equivalent of the speci…c tari¤s using world prices at time t. We thus incorporate both legislated changes in tari¤ rates and price level induced changes in tari¤ rates for each period, which results in an increase in the the mean tari¤ rate from 30.8% in 1930A to 45.7% in 1933 and an increase in the variance from 0.052 to 0.125. In order to abstract from terms of trade changes, we solve for the equilibrium values assuming that prices remain constant at the 1930A levels, so that consumers and producers are assumed to be facing the tari¤ laden price vector t q 0 at t. 12 Value added price: p V ( 0 (qt);q 0 )
Consumption price: P C ( 0 (qt);q 0 )
Employment: L( 0 (qt);q 0 )
Consumption Equivalent : C E ( 0 (qt);q 0 )
Note: Parameter values: s = 2, = 2:5, = :667, M = m = 3:5, C = 2:5, F = 1. Table 3 reports the values for some of the key the aggregate variables from the model, with each variable reported as a percentage change relative to its free trade variable Thus, the e¤ect of the pre-SH tari¤s is to reduce the return to domestic value added by about 1% relative to the free trade level. This is due to the fact that the pre-SH tari¤s increased the price of importables to the production of exports by about 25%, and these imports accounted for approximately 3% of the cost of the exportable good in the base period. Subsequent tari¤ increases due to SH and de ‡ation had little impact on the return to value added. Similarly, the cost of the aggregate consumption bundle was about 1:2% higher in 1930A due to the pre-SH tari¤s, and increased an additional 0:3% due to SH. The third row in Table 3 shows that the aggregate e¤ect of tari¤ protection on TFP at the peak of tari¤s in 1933 was to reduce it by 1:7% relative to the free trade level. Note that almost 2/3 of the e¤ect of tari¤ protection on TFP was due to the pre-SH tari¤s, with SH and the subsequent de ‡ation reducing aggregate productivity by approximately 0:5% compared with the pre-SH level.
In order to calculate the e¤ects on employment and consumption, we choose the utility function parameters s = 2 and = 2:5. These choices yield an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0:5 and a Frisch elasticity of labor supply of 2=3, which are within the range of values obtained from micro studies. 13 With these parameter choices, tari¤ protection leads to 1 3 Chetty et al (2011) argue a Frisch elasticity of 0:75 is the upper bound of values that are consistent with 19 a decrease in consumption of about 1:6% and an increase in employment of about 0:2%. As noted in the discussion of (13), tari¤ protection will decrease consumption relative to free trade because reduction in T F P and p V P C both work to reduce consumption. The e¤ects of these two changes on employment are con ‡icting, and with our chosen parameter values the net e¤ect is a small increase in employment. 14 The equivalent consumption e¤ect indicates that at the peak of tari¤ protection, consumption would need to be increased by 1:7% to raise welfare to the free trade level. This is essentially equal to the TFP e¤ect due to the minimal e¤ect of protection on the level of employment. 15 The comparison between the uniform tari¤ equivalent and the mean tari¤ shows that although the mean tari¤ was 45:7% at its peak, the e¤ect of the tari¤ structure was equivalent to that of a uniform tari¤ of 69:7%. The increase in the variance of tari¤s thus had a signi…cant e¤ect in increasing the distortion associated with the protective structure as measured by the uniform tari¤ equivalent. However, as already noted it had a relatively small e¤ect on the aggregate productivity and welfare measures.
How would the outcome have di¤ered if Smoot Hawley had never been passed?
We can address this question by solving the model using the e¤ective tari¤ rates associated with the pre-SH tari¤ legislation for all three periods of the panel, 0 (q t ). This exercise captures the e¤ect of the decline in world prices on the e¤ective tari¤ rate for goods that had speci…c tari¤s under the pre SH legislation. As in the benchmark case, we assume world prices remain …xed at the initial level. The results for this counterfactual exercise on the aggregate measures are reported in Table 4 . Since the pre-SH tari¤ included a number of speci…c tari¤ rates, the decline in prices still yielded an increase in the 1930B and 1933 cross sections that was about half that arising from the Smoot Hawley legislation as shown by the mean tari¤ rate. Interestingly, the variance of tari¤s in 1933 would have been comparable to that under SH. As a result, the increase in the uniform tari¤ equivalent is almost 2/3 of that occurring with SH. The decline in TFP in the absence of SH would have been 1:5% relative to the free trade level, and the required consumption increase to compensate for the decline in tari¤ protection would have been 1:5% as well. These results indicate that if Smoot Hawley had not been passed, the increase in the tari¤ distortion would have been more than half of that which occurred under SH, because de ‡ation would have been responsible for a substantial increase in both the mean and dispersion of tari¤ rates. micro. Elasiticities of intertemporal substitution in the range of 0:5 to 1 are typically obtained in studies using household data on consumption (eg. Attanasio, Banks,and Tanner (2002)). 1 4 If we choose s = 1 and = 1, we obtain a small reduction in employment as a result of tari¤s. However, the consumption equivalent is similar in this case. 1 5 It can be shown that the measures reported in Table 3 are independent of the parameters ; A; and K. VA price: p V ( 0 (qt);q 0 )
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Cons price: P C ( 0 (qt);q 0 )
Notes: Parameter values same as benchmark, Table 3 .
In order to test the sensitivity of these results to our assumptions regarding the elasticities of substitution between domestic and imported goods, we also consider a case where we double the elasticities to m = M = 7 and C = 5. The results for this exercise are reported in Table 5 . TFP now declines by 4:9% relative to free trade with the pre-SH tari¤s with the higher substitution elasticities, which is more than 4 times that in the benchmark case. A larger elasticity of substitution leads to a substantially larger e¤ect on TFP because of the greater substitution away from imported goods due to tari¤ protection. In addition to a larger e¤ect on productivity, the higher elasticity also results in a substantially larger impact on employment, which now rises by 1:4%. As a result of the increase in employment, the amount of consumption required to reach the free trade level (5:6%) exceeds the TFP e¤ect (5:3%) in magnitude. The subsequent SH tari¤s and de ‡ation (1933) reduce TFP by an additional 0:4% relative to the free trade level. Finally, we note that increasing the elasticity of substitution between importables also has the e¤ect of increasing the uniform tari¤ equivalent of the tari¤ structure. The greater substitution elasticities raise the distortion associated with variance in the tari¤ structure, and thus tends to raise the uniform tari¤ equivalent. Parameter values: C = 5; m = M = 7; rest as in benchmark 
22
These results suggest that the aggregate cost of tari¤ protection can be fairly sensitive to the assumptions made regarding m and C . Figure 5 shows how the loss in TFP varies with the value of the substitution elasticities for each of the cross sections we analyze, with elasticities ( m ; M ; C ) evaluated at 1, 4/3, 5/3 and 2 times their benchmark values For each cross section, the magnitude of the total loss from tari¤ protection relative to free trade is non-linear in the substitution elasticity. Interestingly, however, the incremental loss moving from 1930A to 1933 due to the SH tari¤s is in the 0:4 0:5% range for all of the elasticity values. Thus, the incremental impact of SH is quite robust to the elasticity assumption in this range. Notes: Parameter values same as benchmark, Table 3 .
As a …nal exercise, we consider the impact of a doubling of the US import share using the benchmark elasticity assumptions. That imports were a small fraction of GDP is one factor in explaining why the aggregate impact of tari¤ protection is relatively small in our benchmark case. The raises the question of how large import shares must be in order to have signi…cant e¤ects on aggregate productivity and welfare. increased substantially in this counterfactual, there is only a minor e¤ect on the uniform tari¤ equivalent. This is because the uniform tari¤ equivalent captures the e¤ect of tari¤s on one import category relative to another. Doubling the import volume increases the e¤ects on all import categories proportionally, and thus has a minimal e¤ect on this aggregate measure.
Conclusions
We have constructed a panel of tari¤ lines to quantify the e¤ect of the Smoot Hawley tari¤ legislation on the mean and dispersion of tari¤ rates. The panel shows that the mean e¤ective tari¤ rate increased from 31% to 46% between 1930 and 1933, and that the variance of tari¤ rates at the tari¤ line level more than doubled over the same period. We also used this panel to construct tari¤ wedges re ‡ecting the increased price of imported materials for domestic production sectors. The mean of these wedges increased from 32% to 59%, and the variance more than doubled. The role of dispersion on tari¤ rates was captured by the fact that the uniform tari¤ rate equivalent exceeded the average tari¤ rate by 18% under the pre-SH tari¤s in 1930, and this di¤erential increased to 24% by 1933. This result showed that the tari¤ structure was substantially more distorting than suggested by the average tari¤ rate, and the increased variance in tari¤ rates from SH raised the di¤erential between the uniform tari¤ equivalent and the average tari¤.
Although our tari¤ line analysis indicated the existence of substantial sectoral distortions, our general equilibrium model indicated that the impact of these distortions at the aggregate level was relatively modest in the benchmark parameterization. The pre-SH tari¤ protection reduced TFP by 1:1% relative to free trade, and the SH legislation was responsible for a further 0:5% decline in TFP We also showed that if SH had not been passed, the presence of speci…c tari¤s in the existing tari¤ legislation would have reduced TFP by 0:3% between 1930 and 1933 due to declining world prices. This conclusion is consistent with previous …ndings of Crucini (1994) and Irwin (1998) that de ‡ation was responsible for a signi…cant portion of the increase in e¤ective tari¤ rates that occurred following the passage of the SH legislation.
Two caveats should be kept in mind in interpreting our results on the aggregate e¤ects of the SH tari¤s. First, the aggregate e¤ects could be larger if the true substitution elasticities are larger than the ones used in our benchmark analysis. Our counterfactual exercise showed that a doubling of the elasticities of substitution led to a quadrupling of the e¤ect of pre-SH tari¤s on TFP. In addition, larger elasticities resulted in more signi…cant e¤ects on labor markets. Note however, that the incremental e¤ect of the SH legislation and decline in world prices on TFP from 1930-1933 was quite robust across the di¤erent elasticity assumptions. This suggests the value of investigating the tari¤ policies over the interwar era to better capture the aggregate impacts of commercial policy during the Great Depression.
Second, we assume that tari¤s have no e¤ect on world prices. Such an assumption is appropriate when the country in question is a small country, or when retaliation by foreign countries 24 o¤sets any e¤ects of tari¤s on the terms of trade. The existence of a favorable terms of trade e¤ect for the tari¤ imposing country would reduce the magnitude of the loss in productivity, or could even lead to a higher productivity level. However, our data did not suggest the presence of signi…cant reductions in world prices as a result of the Smoot Hawley tari¤s.
Our analysis could also be extended to incorporate additional e¤ects of tari¤ protection. For example, our analysis does not incorporate the e¤ects of tari¤ protection on capital accumulation. Crucini and Kahn (1996) …nd that persistent tari¤ protection can reduce capital accumulation, which would lead to a larger aggregate e¤ect of tari¤ protection. Finally, tari¤ protection could lead to larger e¤ects on productivity if it leads …rms to increase markups. Such an outcome could occur if …rms are imperfectly competitive and tari¤ protection makes …rm demand curves less elastic, or if protection facilitates the formation of cartels. These represent areas for future work.
6 Appendix A
The matching algorithm takes two arrays of text descriptions as inputs. The output is a matrix of scores in which the ijth element is a number between zero and 1 for the quality of a match between row i from the …rst data set and row j from the second. A score of 1 means that the text descriptions are identical and a score of zero means they have no characters in common. Figure A.1 shows the number of matches as a function of the quality of the match. Beginning with a minimum threshold of 0.8, the number of matches is 1,800 and fall to about 1,690 where the match is for all intents and purposes 'perfect.'
FIGURE A.1 -MATCHING ALGORITHM EXAMPLE, 1930
While the matching algorithm is an invaluable tool, it does not resolve the issue of eight scenarios involving line-item splitting, aggregation or reorganization across periods. For example, our matching procedure does not rule out more than one 1930A line item being matched to the same 1930B (or 1933) line item. We must account for this type of aggregation in the data. To do this we collect the set all best matches which are connected to each other through one or more line item aggregations. We then construct an aggregated line item series by creating a weighted average of the individual line items where the 1930A import values are used as weights. After completing the construction of a balanced panel, the size of our cross-section shrinks to 495 line items. This occurs for two reasons. First, aggregation naturally reduces the number of individual tari¤ lines and due to a large degree of re-organization between 1930A and 1930B/1933; it is common for two or line items to be matched to the same line item in a later cross-section. Second, aggregation exacerbates missing data issues. Any set of line items which is matched to any individual observation with missing data have to be discarded since the aggregation cannot be performed. 
